Tejas; Set to soar or doomed for an ill fate?
Despite decades of development, India’s much-touted first indigenous LCA Tejas still needs the attention it deserves. The Indian Navy’s rejection of the Tejas MK 1 variant and the Air Force’s voiced misgivings shed shade on what some may hastily identify as a success story.
While the HAL Tejas has been deemed a success, it has been described as delayed. Although it is not currently considered battle-ready for conflict, it can do some combat tasks. On the other hand, the production timeline portrays a less rosy image, with significant delays pushing the delivery plan back several years and making it a significant setback for the IAF.
Since its inception in the 1990s, the HAL Tejas project has produced a small number of aircraft, and only nine have been delivered, falling well short of the lofty objective set in 2016 of providing eight jets each year. The anticipated advancement to 16 aircraft per year following the second manufacturing line has proven vague, highlighting a significant delivery failure.
Years later, Tejas still clings onto a skinny rope of ifs and buts, a somewhat questionable aircraft because of its challenges compared to Dassault or Boeing. Despite high hopes, Tejas fails to deliver cutting-edge technology to compensate for the inexperience of Indian defence organizations. Expecting Tejas to match combatants with 20–60 years of experience is laughable. Convincing purchasers would be challenging even if it could (which is a huge if).
In comparison to competitors such as Rafale, Tejas needs to be tested. The world’s hesitation in buying Tejas furthered, given its untested track record and its provenance as an Indian still heavily reliant on imported defence commodities. A precondition for sales is the creation of a sufficient fleet for our own Air Force in which India lags. Following the establishment of Tejas’Tejas’ operational merits in actual warfare, which may take 15–20 years, only then Teja’s exports can be of prospect. In the meantime, Teja’s substantial export goals are now seen as unrealistic.
In addition, due to its exorbitant cost, Tejas imposes a substantial financial burden on taxpayers. Given HAL’sHAL’s record, India’s chances of acquiring buyers for this possible white elephant are bleak. The Marut HF-24 (HAL’sHAL’s first indigenous fighter jet), dubbed “the flying coffin,” resulted in pilot deaths due to the inability to remove the canopy before ejecting, with a safety ratio even poorer than the MiG-21, a notable chapter in Indian history.
Regarding the Naval Tejas, its inability to achieve the Navy’s expectations in 2016 raises essential doubts regarding its efficacy in achieving operational needs. However, exploring partnerships with experienced international aircraft manufacturers, such as Saab or Boeing, is a feasible path of action, presenting a sensible answer to the project’s issues.
In conclusion, while the HAL Tejas story is overflowing with achievements, it is indisputably tainted by delays. Its operating limitations and disappointed deadlines prompt a reconsideration of strategy and prospective international alliances for a more robust and timely progression.
